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INTRODUCTION 
Legal doctrines developed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit are often criticized for being inappropriately 
“exceptionalist.”1  The Supreme Court’s recently increased interest in 
patent law2 can be understood, in large part, as a project of 
“assimilating patent doctrine to general legal principles.”3  The 
Court’s desire to mainstream Federal Circuit law is particularly 
evident in areas that can be characterized as procedural or that are, at 
minimum, outside the core of substantive patent law, including 
standing,4 subject matter jurisdiction,5 standards of appellate review,6 
and remedies.7  In all of those areas, the Supreme Court has overturned 
Federal Circuit rulings that developed, for patent cases only, legal 
principles that differed from those that apply in other federal cases.  For 
instance, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,8 the Supreme Court rejected 
the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” that a permanent injunction should 
automatically issue upon a finding of patent infringement, instead 
instructing lower courts to apply the usual, fact-specific, equitable test.9  
And in Gunn v. Minton10 the Supreme Court abrogated Federal Circuit 
decisions granting the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction in any state 
law case requiring an analysis of patent validity or infringement, such 
as a legal malpractice case against a patent lawyer.11  Instead, the 
                                                
 1. See Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 
1426 (2016) (collecting commentary). 
 2. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in 
Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY 62 (2013); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Federal Circuit’s 
Acquiescence(?), 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1061 (2017). 
 3. Lee, supra note 1, at 1416. 
 4. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007). 
 5. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013). 
 6. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015). 
 7. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
 8. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 9. Id. at 393–94. 
 10. 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). 
 11. Id. at 1065; see, e.g., Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss 
Hauer & Feld, LLP, 504 F.3d 1262, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2007), abrogated by Gunn, 133 S. 
Ct. 1059; Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1289 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007), abrogated by Gunn, 133 S. Ct. 1059; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012) 
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Court reiterated its prior holdings in cases under the general federal 
question statute12 that the mere need to apply federal law is 
insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction.13 
Despite the Court’s obvious skepticism about exceptionalist rules in 
patent cases, many patent lawyers and scholars have recently urged 
the Court to adopt an exceptionalist approach in one important area 
of patent procedure:  venue.  The venue statute for patent 
infringement lawsuits permits a patentee to bring suit in, among other 
places, “the judicial district where the defendant resides.”14  Another 
portion of the venue statute defines “residence,” stating that “[f]or all 
venue purposes” defendants that are corporations are “deemed to 
reside . . . in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to 
the court’s personal jurisdiction.”15  The Federal Circuit has adopted a 
straightforward reading of those two statutes, holding that venue is 
proper in patent infringement cases against corporations in any 
district in which the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.16 
Yet, as this Article goes to press, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation 
of the patent venue statute is under assault at the Supreme Court in 
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC.17  The petitioner in 
that case—and other skeptics of Federal Circuit venue doctrine18—
complain that, because personal jurisdiction in patent cases typically 
                                                
(granting the federal courts exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over all cases 
“arising under” federal patent law). 
 12. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
 13. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1067–68 (citing, among other cases, Empire Healthchoice 
Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 701 (2006)); see also Grable & Sons Metal 
Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313 (2005) (noting that the Court 
has “sh[ied] away from the expansive view that mere need to apply federal law in a 
state-law claim will suffice to” establish federal jurisdiction). 
 14. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 
 15. Id. § 1391(c)(2).  Though we generally use the term “corporation” 
throughout this Article, § 1391(c) treats corporations and other business entities, 
such as LLCs, identically for venue purposes.  See id. (“[A]n entity with the capacity to 
sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not 
incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in 
which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to 
the civil act in question . . . .”). 
 16. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1584 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990). 
 17. See In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338, 1341–43 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted 
sub nom. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016). 
 18. See infra notes 129–33 (cataloguing the substantial amicus support the 
petitioner in TC Heartland has received at the Supreme Court). 
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exists in any state in which an infringing product is sold,19 the Federal 
Circuit’s interpretation of the venue statute places no meaningful 
constraints on the plaintiff’s choice of forum.20  As we show in this 
Article, however, such an expansive venue rule is not unusual in 
federal litigation.  Over the past century, Congress has steadily 
expanded venue options in all types of federal cases, particularly in 
cases where the defendant is a corporation.21  The leading treatise on 
civil procedure has gone so far as to say that Congress has “nearly 
eliminate[d] venue as a separate restriction in cases against 
corporations.”22  Though critics of Federal Circuit venue law have 
suggested that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the venue statute 
is outside the mainstream,23 it is those critiques that are, in fact, 
exceptionalist, as they suggest that venue standards should be more 
stringent in patent cases than in other types of federal litigation. 
                                                
 19. See Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994). 
 20. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 37–39, TC Heartland, No. 16-341 (U.S. Sept. 
12, 2016). 
 21. See infra Sections I.B–D. 
 22. 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3802, 
at 37 (4th ed. 2013). 
 23. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 114-235, at 34 (2015) (criticizing the Federal Circuit 
for “collaps[ing] the tests for personal jurisdiction and venue”); Brief for Petitioner 
at 31, TC Heartland, No. 16-341 (U.S. Jan. 30, 2017) (“For corporate defendants . . . , 
the patent venue statute is a dead letter.”); Brief of the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation & Public Knowledge as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4–5, TC 
Heartland, No. 16-341 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2016) (claiming that current law contradicts the 
“general principle that venue serves to protect defendants”); Brief of Washington 
Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 13, TC Heartland, No. 
16-341 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2016) (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s “liberal interpretation of 
venue rules”); Brief of 61 Professors of Law & Economics as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner at 6, TC Heartland, No. 16-341 (U.S. Feb. 6, 2017) (arguing that the 
Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the venue statute is incorrect because “[t]he 
widespread availability of products over the internet means . . . that patent holders 
can file their suit in any district in any state in the country”); Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 20, at 5 (noting that after VE Holding, “defendants were 
suddenly exposed to patent infringement suits in almost any judicial district”); 
Howard I. Shin & Christopher T. Stidvent, The Evolution of Nationwide Venue in Patent 
Infringement Suits, LANDSLIDE, Nov.–Dec. 2016, at 11, 11 (criticizing the Federal 
Circuit for “conflati[ng]” personal jurisdiction and venue); Letter from Professors 
Supporting Venue Reform to House and Senate Members of the Committee on the 
Judiciary (July 12, 2016), http://www.unitedforpatentreform.com/files/professors-
letter-supporting-venue-reform-7-11-161015555780.pdf (“It is imperative that 
Congress address patent venue reform to return basic fairness, rationality, and 
balance to patent law.”). 
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To be clear, as a matter of pure policy, granting plaintiffs 
unbridled discretion over choice of forum in patent cases may be 
problematic.  In the past two years, roughly forty percent of all patent 
cases have been filed in one district:  the Eastern District of Texas.  
Plaintiffs’ discretion over forum selection may incentivize judges to 
adopt rules and practices that are too favorable to patent holders in 
an effort to attract cases—a dynamic several commentators have 
identified in East Texas.24  Also, a heavy concentration of patent cases 
in one district may encourage deep-pocketed litigants to engage in 
unseemly tactics to influence prospective jurors—another dynamic 
that has occurred in East Texas.25  Ultimately, wide discretion in 
forum choice could harm innovation by facilitating nuisance 
litigation by so-called patent trolls.26 
But these problems are emphatically not a consequence of Federal 
Circuit or patent law exceptionalism.  Permissive venue rules, 
particularly in cases involving corporate defendants, are simply not 
unusual.  Though there may be reasons for rethinking whether 
patent litigation should abide by that norm, the Federal Circuit’s 
expansive interpretation of the venue statute is, as we show below, 
both consistent with broader trends in venue law and on solid 
doctrinal footing.27  Moreover, while the patent trolls that dominate 
litigation in East Texas are not a particularly sympathetic type of 
plaintiff, a restrictive interpretation of the patent venue statute could 
have harmful consequences for plaintiffs in other types of civil cases 
with similarly specialized venue statutes.28 
That does not mean nothing should be done about the 
concentration of patent cases in East Texas.  Congress could, of 
course, amend the patent venue statute to restrict forum choice for 
                                                
 24. E.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 
631, 671–76 (2015); Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 
241, 266 (2016). 
 25. Megan La Belle, Judicial Specialization, Patent Cases, and Juries, PRAWFSBLOG 
(June 11, 2015, 6:56 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/06/jud 
icial-specialization-patent-cases-and-juries.html; see also Last Week Tonight with John 
Oliver:  Patents (HBO television broadcast Apr. 19, 2015), https://youtu.be/3bxcc3S 
M_KA (discussing an outdoor ice rink built by Samsung directly in front of the 
courthouse in Marshall, Texas). 
 26. Brief of 61 Professors of Law & Economics, supra note 23, at 9 (citing U.S. 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY:  AN FTC STUDY (2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-
ftc-study/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf. 
 27. See infra Sections I.D, II.C–D. 
 28. See infra Section III.A. 
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patent owners, which is something Congress has already considered 
doing.29  Or Congress could reduce the incentive for litigants to forum 
shop—and the ability of district judges to “forum sell”—by mandating 
increased procedural uniformity in patent cases,30 particularly with 
respect to how cases are assigned within federal districts.31  Finally, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in a pending case on personal jurisdiction, 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court,32 could have a significant effect 
on forum selection in patent infringement suits by requiring a 
stronger nexus between the defendant’s contacts with the forum state 
and the plaintiff’s legal claim. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows:  Part I provides 
necessary background on the federal law of forum selection and 
traces the expansionary trend in venue rules.  Part II provides a close 
analysis of venue law in patent infringement litigation, including the 
issues before the Supreme Court in TC Heartland, and argues that, as a 
doctrinal matter, the Federal Circuit’s current interpretation of the 
venue statute is correct.  Acknowledging that the doctrinal status quo is 
not fully satisfying as a policy matter, Part III concludes by exploring 
ways in which the law of forum selection could be reformed without 
resorting to a questionable interpretation of the venue statute that 
could have unintended consequences beyond patent litigation. 
I. FORUM SELECTION:  LAW AND HISTORY 
One of the first questions civil litigants face when planning a 
federal lawsuit is where to file.  The answer to that question is guided 
by the doctrines of personal jurisdiction, which ensure the court’s 
authority over the defendant,33 and venue, which “is primarily a 
matter of convenience of litigants and witnesses.”34  Today, personal 
jurisdiction is resolved mainly through the “minimum contacts” 
standard developed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington35 and its 
progeny.  Although venue in most federal civil suits is governed by 
the general venue statute, some types of litigation, including patent 
                                                
 29. See Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination (VENUE) Act of 2016, S. 
2733, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 30. Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 63, 111 
(2015). 
 31. See Anderson, supra note 24, at 693–97. 
 32. See 377 P.3d 874, 878 (Cal. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 827 (2017). 
 33. 4 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 1063, at 330–31. 
 34. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 
560 (1967). 
 35. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
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cases, have specialized venue provisions.36  To interpret these statutes 
properly, it is key to understand the basics of personal jurisdiction 
doctrine as well as the history of both the patent venue statute and 
the general venue statute. 
A. Personal Jurisdiction 
The doctrine of personal jurisdiction limits a court’s ability to bind 
certain defendants based on theories of due process and state 
sovereignty.37  The traditional doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff 38 embraced 
a territorial concept of personal jurisdiction, forbidding courts from 
exercising in personam jurisdiction unless the defendant was served 
with process in the court’s territory or consented to the court’s 
authority.39  Since the Supreme Court’s 1945 decision in International 
Shoe, a more flexible doctrine has prevailed, allowing defendants to 
be sued in any state with which they have sufficient contacts so that 
the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend basic considerations of 
fairness and reasonableness.40 
Today, personal jurisdiction is usually characterized as either 
general or specific.41  Defendants are only subject to general—or “all-
purpose”—jurisdiction if they have contacts that are “so ‘continuous 
and systematic’ as to render [them] essentially at home in the forum 
State.”42  If such contacts exist, the defendant is subject to jurisdiction 
in that state with respect to any lawsuit, even those wholly unrelated 
to the defendant’s contacts.43  Specific jurisdiction, by contrast, 
permits a court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant only when 
                                                
 36. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). 
 37. Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and “Purposeful Availment”:  A Reassessment of 
Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 455, 468 (2004). 
 38. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 39. See id. at 735–36. 
 40. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.  It should be noted that, in recent years, some 
members of the Supreme Court have seemingly argued for a return to a more 
formalistic and territorial understanding of personal jurisdiction.  See, e.g., J. McIntyre 
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882 (2011) (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion) 
(noting that the key question in the personal jurisdiction analysis is “whether the 
defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign”). 
 41. This framework was first proposed in Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. 
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:  A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 
(1966), and was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 42. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761. 
 43. Id. 
LABELLE.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/17  12:27 PM 
1034 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1027 
the defendant’s contacts with the forum state relate to the lawsuit.44  
Drawing on Supreme Court case law, most courts, including the 
Federal Circuit, apply a three-element test for establishing specific 
jurisdiction.  That test requires (1) that the defendant purposefully 
directed activities at residents of the forum state, (2) that the claim 
“arises out of or relates to those activities,” and (3) that the assertion 
of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair.45 
B. Early Restrictions on Venue 
In addition to due process limits on personal jurisdiction, Congress 
has adopted venue statutes to constrain forum choice in federal civil 
litigation.  Importantly, however, these venue statutes have imposed 
fewer and fewer constraints on where corporations may be sued as 
the years have gone by. 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that federal civil suits could be 
filed either where the defendant was an inhabitant or where the 
defendant could be found and served.46  Consequently, plaintiffs 
could wait for a defendant to enter a preferred forum, effect service, 
and then sue there.47  Because this “broad” venue provision 
apparently led to abuse,48 Congress amended the Judiciary Act in 
1887.49  The new Act, which was “part of a general narrowing of 
access to the federal courts,” restricted venue.50  But it treated federal 
question and diversity cases differently.  For federal question cases, 
venue was proper only in the district in which the defendant was an 
inhabitant, whereas diversity suits could be filed in the district where 
either the plaintiff or defendant resided.51 
Over the next decade, a Supreme Court opinion in a patent 
infringement case against a foreign defendant created confusion 
about whether the 1887 Act applied to patent infringement suits.52  
                                                
 44. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 
 45. E.g., Polar Electro Oy v. Suunto Oy, 829 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 46. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79. 
 47. Richard C. Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25 STAN. L. REV. 
551, 553 (1973). 
 48. 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3802, at 18. 
 49. Act of March 3, 1887, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552–53. 
 50. 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3802, at 18. 
 51. Act of March 3, 1887 § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552–53.  Under the 1887 Act, courts 
treated the concepts of inhabitance and residence interchangeably to mean, for 
corporations, the state of incorporation.  See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3802, 
at 19 n.17. 
 52. See Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 564 (1942) 
(attributing the confusion to In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 662 (1893), in which the 
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Some courts held that it did not, applying the original Judiciary Act 
and allowing patent infringement suits to be filed wherever the 
defendant could be served.53  Other courts, however, ruled that the 
general venue statute did, in fact, apply in patent cases (at least in 
cases filed against domestic defendants), permitting plaintiffs to sue 
for patent infringement only where the defendant was an inhabitant, 
meaning, for corporations, the state in which the defendant was 
incorporated.54  A decade after it passed the 1887 Act, Congress 
stepped in to resolve this conflict about patent venue. 
C. The Patent Venue Statute 
In 1897, Congress enacted a venue statute specifically for patent 
cases.55  Notably, the new statute did not simply provide that patent 
infringement actions would be governed by the 1887 Act, which 
would have limited venue to districts in which the defendant was an 
inhabitant.  Instead, Congress determined that venue in patent 
infringement actions should be broader than in other federal question 
cases.56  Specifically, the new statute (which is nearly identical to the 
version in force today) provided, 
                                                
Court wrote that the 1887 Act did not apply to a suit against a foreign corporation 
“especially in a suit for the infringement of a patent right”). 
 53. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Earl, 82 F. 690, 694 (9th Cir. 1897); Smith v. Sargent 
Mfg. Co., 67 F. 801, 801 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1895). 
 54. See, e.g., Nat’l Typewriter Co. v. Pope Mfg. Co., 56 F. 849, 849 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893); 
Gormully & Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Pope Mfg. Co., 34 F. 818, 820 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888). 
 55. Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 392 § 1, 29 Stat. 695; see also H.R. REP. NO. 2905 
(1897) (“This bill seeks to define the jurisdiction of the courts in patent suits and to 
remove the uncertainty which now arises as to such jurisdiction by reason of the 
conflicting decisions of the various circuit courts.”). 
 56. See 29 CONG. REC. 1900 (1897) (statement of Rep. Lacey) (explaining that the 
Act “provides that the court shall have jurisdiction in the district of which the 
defendant is an inhabitant, and that is the existing law now, or—[i]n any district in 
which the defendant, whether a person, partnership, or corporation, shall have 
committed acts of infringement and have a regular and established place of 
business”); see also Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 
712–13 (1972) (“The new provision . . . was rather less restrictive than the general 
venue provision then applicable to claims arising under federal law.”); Indus. 
Research Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 29 F.2d 623, 626 (N.D. Ohio 1928) (“A 
consideration of the proceedings in Congress resulting in the passage of [the patent 
venue statute] leaves it clear that the legislative purpose was to facilitate adjudication 
of patent grants in the general public interest, by enlarging jurisdictional 
opportunities to bring infringers into a federal court.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, 
Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1453 (2010) (noting that the 1897 patent venue 
statute “broaden[ed] venue beyond the choices in the 1887 rule”). 
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[I]n suits brought for the infringement of letters patent the circuit 
courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, in law or in 
equity, in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in 
any district in which the defendant, whether a person, partnership, 
or corporation, shall have committed acts of infringement and 
have a regular and established place of business.57 
The fact that this statute made forum options in patent cases 
broader than in other federal question cases undermines the 
suggestion—often made by skeptics of Federal Circuit venue 
doctrine—that the patent venue statute is supposed to be 
“restrictive.”58  To be sure, the 1897 statute presented a narrower 
range of venue options than was available in the courts that had 
applied the venue rule of the 1789 Judiciary Act to patent cases.59  
The Supreme Court, also comparing the 1789 Act to the patent 
venue statute, has likewise said that the patent venue statute is 
“restrictive.”60  But, in light of prevailing venue law in the late-
nineteenth century, it seems questionable to characterize the 1897 
statute as restrictive.  Recall that, just ten years earlier, Congress had 
limited venue in federal question cases to the defendant’s district of 
inhabitance.  As that statute illustrated, Congress knew quite well how 
to adopt a truly “restrictive” venue provision.  The 1897 patent venue 
statute, which also permitted suit in any district in which the 
defendant committed acts of infringement and had a regular and 
established place of business, was plainly not so restrictive. 
Though 120 years have passed, Congress has made only one 
change to the substance of the patent venue statute.  In 1948, Congress 
replaced the provision allowing venue in the “district of which the 
defendant is an inhabitant” with the “district where the defendant 
                                                
 57. Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695, 695 (emphasis added). 
 58. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae 32 Internet Companies, Retailers, and 
Associations in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, TC Heartland LLC v. 
Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, No. 16-341 (U.S. Sept. 27, 2016) (“In the nineteenth 
century, Congress passed a statute to restrict venue in patent cases . . . .”); Brief of 
Amici Curiae of 56 Professors of Law & Economics, at 2, TC Heartland, No. 16-341 
(Oct. 17, 2016) (arguing that the 1897 patent venue statute “limited jurisdiction in 
patent cases” (emphasis added)); Dennis Crouch, TC Heartland:  Statutory 
Interpretation, Fairness, and E.D. Texas, PATENTLYO (Feb. 7, 2017), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/02/heartland-statutory-interpretation-fairness.html 
(stating that the patent venue statute “appears to severely limit venue in patent 
cases”). 
 59. See supra note 46. 
 60. Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 566 (1942); accord 
Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Const. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 204 (2000); Pure Oil 
Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 207 (1966). 
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resides.”61  Thus, the current patent venue statute reads, “Any civil action 
for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the 
defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of 
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”62 
D. Amendments to the General Venue Statute 
While Congress has made only one substantive change to the patent 
venue statute since 1897, it has repeatedly changed the general venue 
statute.  And, in each instance, it has broadened venue options. 
The 1948 revision to the patent venue statute was part of a larger 
effort to clarify where venue is proper when the defendant is a 
corporation rather than a natural person.  Up to that point, courts 
treated corporations as residents of only their state of incorporation.63  
Thus, in addition to amending the patent venue statute, Congress 
expanded the scope of general venue in suits against corporations in a 
new provision, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), which stated that “[a] 
corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is 
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such 
judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation 
for venue purposes.”64  As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, the 
purpose of this broadened definition of residence was to allow 
corporations to be sued wherever they were “creating liabilities.”65 
In the 1960s, Congress continued to expand forum options under 
the general venue statute.  Though the 1948 amendments expanded 
venue in suits against corporations, the general venue statute, in the 
eyes of many observers, still had a significant shortcoming:  it often 
precluded suit in a district “where the claim arose . . . , even when 
that district provided the most convenient and most logical forum for 
resolving the dispute.”66  Thus, in 1966, Congress added to the 
general venue statute the option of “transactional venue,” providing 
that venue was proper in “the judicial district . . . in which the claim 
arose,”67 regardless of whether the defendant could be said to be 
“doing business” there. 
In 1988, Congress again amended the general venue statute to 
expand venue options.  Importantly, Congress removed the 
                                                
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1970). 
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). 
 63. 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3811, at 264. 
 64. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1952). 
 65. Pure Oil, 384 U.S. at 204 n.3. 
 66. 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3802, at 19–20. 
 67. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), (b) (1970). 
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substantive portion of § 1391(c) (that is, the language allowing a 
corporation to be sued where “it is incorporated or licensed to do 
business or is doing business”) and made § 1391(c) purely definitional.68  
The newly amended version of § 1391(c) also tied the definition of 
corporate residence to personal jurisdiction.  And the new version of the 
statute began with a prefatory phrase making clear that its definition of 
corporate residence applied to other venue provisions in the same 
chapter of the U.S. Code (including the patent venue statute, codified at 
§ 1400(b)).  The new version of § 1391(c) read, “For purposes of venue 
under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed 
to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal 
jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.”69 
The 1988 changes to § 1391(c) are consistent with the trend of 
broadening venue over corporate defendants.  Indeed, because personal 
jurisdiction must exist in every suit, it was the 1988 amendments in 
particular that led the Wright and Miller treatise to observe that 
Congress had “nearly eliminate[d] venue as a separate restriction in 
cases against corporations.”70  As another leading commentator noted, 
under the venue statute enacted in 1988, once a court has assessed 
personal jurisdiction, it has also assessed venue:  “[T]here is no separate, 
potentially vague test for that separate issue.”71  Or, as the reporter for 
the subcommittee that drafted the 1988 venue statute wrote, the version 
of § 1391(c) adopted in 1988 “sharply reduc[ed] the role played by 
venue in selecting the courts in which a corporate defendant can be 
sued.”72  Instead, it was personal jurisdiction that became “the primary 
source of forum selection rules.”73 
After expanding the definition of residence for corporate 
defendants in 1988, Congress, in 1990, broadened the concept of 
transactional venue.  Recall that the statute adopted in 1966 
permitted venue in “the judicial district . . . in which the claim 
arose.”74  The statute’s use of “the” had the “obvious implication that 
there is one, and only one, district in which any claim arises.”75  In 
                                                
 68. See Pub. L. 100-702 § 1013, 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988). 
 69. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988). 
 70. 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3802, at 37. 
 71. RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 261 (3d ed. 2012). 
 72. Edward H. Cooper, Memoranda on Venue and Changes to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), 39 
PAT. COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK J. 435, 437 (1990). 
 73. Id. (noting also that “[v]enue would remain a matter of concern only in 
selecting between different district courts within a single state”). 
 74. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), (b) (1970) (emphasis added). 
 75. 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3802, at 22–23. 
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1990, Congress amended the statute to permit venue in “a judicial 
district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving 
rise to the claim occurred,” making it “absolutely clear that venue 
may be proper in more than one district.”76 
Congress most recently amended the general venue statute in 
2011.  Through that amendment, Congress eliminated the distinction 
between venue in diversity cases and federal question cases that had 
existed since 1887.77  The 2011 amendments also added a subsection, 
codified at § 1391(a), titled “Applicability of Section,” which begins,  
“Except as otherwise provided by law[,] this section shall govern the 
venue of all civil actions brought in district courts of the United 
States.”78  The 2011 amendments further expanded venue by making 
clear that venue and personal jurisdiction are synonymous not just 
for defendants that are corporations but for all entities “with the 
capacity to sue and be sued.”79  Finally, Congress broadened all of 
§ 1391(c)’s definitions of residence so that they apply “[f]or all venue 
purposes,”80 rather than “[f]or purposes of venue under this 
chapter,” as was the case under the 1988 version of the statute.81 
* *  * 
In sum, Congress has, over the past century, steadily expanded 
venue options, particularly in suits against corporate defendants.  In 
1887, the only venue option for a federal question suit against a 
corporate defendant was the defendant’s place of incorporation.  In 
1897, Congress made clear that that restrictive rule did not apply to 
patent infringement suits, providing that venue also existed in any 
district in which the defendant committed acts of infringement and 
had a regular and established place of business.  In 1948, Congress 
                                                
 76. Id. at 36. 
 77. The new, unified general venue statute provides simply, 
A civil action may be brought in— 
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are 
residents of the State in which the district is located; 
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions 
giving rise to the claim occurred . . . ; or 
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as 
provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is 
subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2012). 
 78. Id. § 1391(a)(1). 
 79. Id. § 1391(c)(2). 
 80. Id. § 1391(c). 
 81. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988). 
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expanded the general venue statute to allow suit in any district where 
the defendant was doing business.  Congress further broadened 
venue options by enacting transactional venue in 1966.  Since that 
time, Congress has expanded transactional venue and further 
broadened the definition of residence for corporate defendants so 
that, today, venue is a minimal restriction in all federal civil actions 
against corporations. 
II. VENUE LAW IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES 
From time to time, courts have addressed questions about how the 
general venue statute and the patent venue statute interact.  TC 
Heartland is the most recent example. The core of the petitioner’s 
argument is that the Federal Circuit’s current interpretation of the 
venue statute, which permits corporations and other business entities 
to be sued for patent infringement in any district in which they are 
subject to personal jurisdiction, conflicts with the Supreme Court’s 
1957 decision in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp.,82 which 
was itself based on the Court’s 1942 decision in Stonite Products Co. v. 
Melvin Lloyd Co.83  In both cases, the Court held that the general 
venue statute in effect at the time did not supplement the patent 
venue statute.84  In the Federal Circuit’s landmark 1990 decision in 
VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., by contrast, the court 
held that the then-newly expanded definition of corporate residence 
in the general venue statute, § 1391(c), did apply to the patent venue 
statute.85  The petitioner in TC Heartland also claims that, whatever 
the merits of VE Holding, which was decided under the 1988 version 
of the venue statute, the 2011 amendments to § 1391 made that 
section’s definition of corporate residence inapplicable to patent 
cases.  Before explaining why the attack on the Federal Circuit’s 
understanding of venue law is unsound, a brief synopsis of Stonite, 
Fourco, and VE Holding is in order. 
A. Stonite, Fourco, and VE Holding 
In its 1942 decision in Stonite, the Supreme Court held that the 
patent venue statute, then codified at 28 U.S.C. § 48, was “the exclusive 
provision controlling venue in patent infringement proceedings.”86  In 
                                                
 82. 353 U.S. 222 (1957). 
 83. 315 U.S. 561 (1942). 
 84. See Fourco, 353 U.S. at 228–29; Stonite, 315 U.S. at 566–67. 
 85. 917 F.2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 86. Stonite, 315 U.S. at 563. 
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that case, the Court rejected a patentee’s effort to invoke a relatively 
obscure provision of the general venue statute providing that, when 
two or more defendants resided in different districts within the same 
state, the suit could be brought in either district.87  The Court 
emphasized that Congress adopted the patent venue statute in 1897 
for the purpose of removing uncertainty about whether the general 
venue statute of 1887 applied to patent infringement suits.88  “That 
purpose,” the Court concluded, “indicates that Congress did not 
intend the Act of 1897 to dovetail with the general provisions relating 
to the venue of civil suits, but rather that it alone should control venue 
in patent infringement proceedings.”89 
In 1948, between Stonite and Fourco, Congress enacted § 1391(c), 
which, as discussed, stated that “[a] corporation may be sued in any 
judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business 
or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the 
residence of such corporation for venue purposes.”90  The Supreme 
Court in Fourco considered whether this new definition of corporate 
residence applied to the patent venue statute.91  In that case, the 
plaintiff, Transmirra, sued Fourco, a West Virginia corporation, for 
patent infringement in the Southern District of New York.92  
Although Fourco had an established place of business in the 
Southern District, there was no evidence it had committed acts of 
infringement there.93  Fourco, therefore, moved to dismiss, arguing 
that venue was improper under § 1400(b).94  Transmirra countered 
that venue was in fact proper under § 1400(b) because Fourco 
“resided” in the Southern District, as defined by § 1391(c), by virtue 
of “doing business” there.95  Transmirra’s position, in other words, 
was that the definition of corporate residence in newly enacted 
§ 1391(c) should apply to § 1400(b). 
                                                
 87. Id. at 562. 
 88. Id. at 564. 
 89. Id. at 565–66. 
 90. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1952). 
 91. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 223–24 (1957). 
 92. Id. at 223. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 224.  Recall that § 1400(b) provides, “Any civil action for patent 
infringement may be brought in [(1)] the judicial district where the defendant 
resides, or [(2)] where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a 
regular and established place of business.” 
 95. Brief for the Respondents at 2, Fourco, 353 U.S. 222 (1957) (No. 310). 
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The Supreme Court rejected Transmirra’s argument and held that 
venue in the Southern District was improper.96  The Court began its 
analysis by reiterating Stonite’s holding that § 48 was the exclusive 
provision governing venue in patent cases.97  Though the patentee 
argued that newly enacted § 1391(c), including its definition of 
corporate residence, was “clear and unambiguous and that its terms 
include[d] all actions—including patent infringement actions—
against corporations,” the Court applied the canon that specific terms 
in a statute prevail over the general to conclude that the “special 
venue statute” codified in § 1400(b), which the Court viewed as 
“equally clear” in meaning, was unaffected by the “general 
corporation venue statute,” § 1391.98  The Court also relied heavily on 
the legislative history of the 1948 amendments, noting that 
“[s]tatements made by several of the persons having importantly to 
do with the 1948 revision are uniformly clear that no changes of law 
or policy are to be presumed from changes of language in the 
revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly expressed.”99 
Thus, the Court held in Fourco, the term “reside” in § 1400(b) would 
continue to mean the state of incorporation only, just as it did in all 
federal lawsuits before the 1948 amendments to the venue statute.100 
In 1988, as discussed, Congress amended the general venue statute 
again, enacting the version of § 1391(c) that made it purely 
definitional, stating that “[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter, 
a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any 
judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction.”101  VE 
Holding presented the Federal Circuit with the question of whether 
that amendment affected the Supreme Court’s decision in Fourco.102  
VE Holding had sued Johnson Gas Appliance for patent 
infringement in the Northern District of California.103  Johnson, an 
Iowa corporation, moved to dismiss for improper venue on the 
grounds that it did not “reside” in the Northern District under Fourco 
                                                
 96. Fourco, 353 U.S. at 229. 
 97. Id. at 228–29. 
 98. Id. at 228. 
 99. Id. at 227 (citing commentary by William W. Barron, the Chief Reviser of the 
Code; Professor James William Moore, a special consultant on the revision; and 
Judge Albert B. Maris, a Third Circuit judge and committee member of the Judicial 
Conference). 
 100. Id. at 226. 
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988). 
 102. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990). 
 103. Id. at 1576. 
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because it was not incorporated there and it did not have a “regular 
and established place of business” there.104  VE Holding, on the other 
hand, asserted that Johnson did “reside” in the Northern District 
because that term, used in § 1400(b), was now defined by the newly 
revised § 1391(c) and equated corporate residence with personal 
jurisdiction.  (Johnson conceded that it was subject to personal 
jurisdiction in the Northern District.105) 
The Federal Circuit sided with VE Holding and ruled that venue 
was proper.  Though the prior version of § 1391(c) stated that “[a] 
corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is 
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and 
such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such 
corporation for venue purposes,”106 the court held that the addition of 
the prefatory language—“[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter”—
to the new, stand-alone definition of corporate residence in § 1391(c) 
overruled the Supreme Court’s holding in Fourco (and Stonite before 
that) that the patent venue statute was not affected by the general 
venue statute.107  Though there was no “express legislative history” 
indicating that the 1988 amendment was intended to affect the 
patent venue statute, the court looked to the plain meaning of the 
newly amended statute, observing that “[t]he phrase ‘this chapter’ 
refers to chapter 87 of title 28, which . . . includes § 1400(b),” the 
patent venue statute.108  “On its face,” the court wrote, “§ 1391(c) 
clearly applies to § 1400(b), and thus redefines the meaning of the 
term ‘resides’ in that section.”109 
In addition to relying on the plain meaning of § 1391(c), the court 
in VE Holding also acknowledged the trends in venue law discussed 
above.  For instance, the court noted that the restrictive venue statute 
of 1887 “has long since been superseded by more liberalized venue 
law, so that the ‘freezing’ of patent venue as a result of Fourco has 
made patent venue an anomaly.”110  Finally, the court drew on the 
views of contemporary commentators, who argued that venue should 
be no different in patent infringement cases than in other civil cases 
                                                
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1584. 
 106. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1952) (emphasis added). 
 107. VE Holding, 917 F.3d at 1580. 
 108. Id. at 1578; see also id. at 1581 (“That there may be no specific legislative 
history regarding the amendment’s effect on § 1400(b) does not modify this court’s 
duty to employ the plain meaning of the language that the Congress adopted.”). 
 109. Id. at 1578. 
 110. Id. at 1582–83. 
LABELLE.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/17  12:27 PM 
1044 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1027 
and that restrictive venue laws “serve[d] only to prolong patent 
litigation and make it more expensive.”111 
B. TC Heartland 
VE Holding has governed venue in patent cases for more than 
twenty-five years.  Recently, however, the topic of patent venue has 
received substantial attention because the vast majority of patent 
cases have become concentrated in just a few federal courts, 
particularly the Eastern District of Texas.112  Yet it is TC Heartland—a 
case arising out of the District of Delaware, not East Texas—that has 
brought the issue of patent venue back to the Supreme Court. 
In that case, Kraft Foods (a Delaware LLC with its principal place 
of business in Illinois) sued Heartland (an Indiana LLC 
headquartered in Indiana) in the District of Delaware, asserting that 
Heartland’s liquid water enhancers infringed three of Kraft’s 
patents.113  Heartland moved to dismiss Kraft’s lawsuit for lack of 
personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, to dismiss or transfer the case 
for improper venue.114  In support of its motion, Heartland asserted 
that it was not registered to do business in Delaware, that it had no 
presence in Delaware, and that it had neither entered into contracts 
in nor solicited sales in Delaware.115  Heartland admitted that it had 
shipped some of the allegedly infringing products into Delaware, 
accounting for approximately two percent of Heartland’s total annual 
sales of those products.116  After the district court denied its 
motion,117  Heartland sought interlocutory review by filing a 
mandamus petition with the Federal Circuit.118 
On mandamus, Heartland’s main argument was that venue was not 
proper in the District of Delaware.  Specifically, Heartland asserted 
                                                
 111. See id. (quoting Wydick, supra note 47, at 584–85). 
 112. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 113. In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub 
nom. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016).  
Specifically, Kraft alleged infringement by Heartland’s “Refreshe” brand drink 
enhancers.  See Complaint at 3–4, Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. TC Heartland, 
LLC, No. CV 14-28, 2015 WL 4778828 (D. Del. 2015). 
 114. TC Heartland, 821 F.3d at 1340.  In addition to seeking dismissal or transfer 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), Heartland also sought transfer under § 1404(a) for the 
convenience of the parties and in the interest of justice.  Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In re TC Heartland LLC, No. 16-105 (Fed. 
Cir. Oct. 23, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/media/2016/01/Heartland.Petition.pdf. 
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that the 2011 addition of the preamble, “[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided by law,” to the general venue statute, § 1391, made clear 
that § 1391 as a whole—including § 1391(c), which defines residence 
for corporations and other business entities—is merely a default rule 
that can be superseded by more specific venue rules elsewhere in the 
U.S. Code.119  In Heartland’s view, the patent venue statute, 
§ 1400(b), was one of those specific rules falling outside the ambit of 
the default provisions and definitions in § 1391.120  Thus, Heartland 
argued, the 2011 amendment overruled VE Holding and reinstated 
venue law as articulated by the Supreme Court in Fourco:  that § 1400(b) 
is the exclusive statute governing venue in patent infringement cases 
and that corporate residence in § 1400(b) refers only to the state of 
incorporation.121 
A Federal Circuit panel unanimously denied mandamus in an 
opinion by Judge Moore in April 2016.122  The court reasoned that 
§ 1400(b) provides no definition of corporate residence but § 1391(c) 
does, and, therefore, that definition should apply to § 1400(b).123  
Although Congress in 2011 added the preamble stating that § 1391 
applies “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,” the court held that 
that phrase could not be read to reinstate Fourco’s definition of 
residence as used in § 1400(b), particularly when § 1391(c) explicitly 
defines corporate residence “[f]or all venue purposes.”124 
Heartland proceeded to file a petition for writ of certiorari, which 
the Supreme Court granted.125  The question presented for review, 
Heartland said, was “precisely the same” as in Fourco:  “Whether 28 
                                                
 119. Id. at 6. 
 120. Id. at 6–8. 
 121. Id. 
 122. TC Heartland, 821 F.3d at 1340. 
 123. Id. at 1341–43. 
 124. Id.  The court also rejected Heartland’s alternative argument that the 
Delaware court lacked personal jurisdiction over most of Kraft’s infringement claims.  
Id. at 1343–45.  As noted above, for personal jurisdiction to exist, the claim must 
“arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s activities in the forum state.  See supra notes 
44–45 and accompanying text.  According to Heartland, Kraft’s claims seeking 
damages for sales made by Heartland in states other than Delaware did not arise out 
of or relate to Heartland’s contacts with Delaware and thus the Delaware court 
lacked personal jurisdiction as to those claims.  See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, 
supra note 118, at 10.  This personal jurisdiction argument raises interesting 
questions, some of which may be answered by the Supreme Court’s impending 
decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb, discussed below.  Infra notes 199–202 and 
accompanying text.  But because Heartland is not pursuing the personal jurisdiction 
argument at the Supreme Court, we leave a full analysis for another time. 
 125. 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016). 
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U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in 
patent infringement actions and is not to be supplemented by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(c).”126  As the question presented indicates, Heartland’s focus 
shifted upon reaching the Supreme Court:  Instead of arguing about the 
2011 amendment’s impact on VE Holding, as it did in the Federal Circuit, 
Heartland’s principal claim on certiorari is that VE Holding conflicts with 
Fourco.127  As Heartland put it, “[w]hether this Court’s precedents 
interpreting § 1400(b) are ‘no longer the law’ is a question that only 
this Court can resolve, and it should do so.”128 
Heartland’s position has some initial appeal.  The issues in VE 
Holding and Fourco appear identical on first blush.  And from a policy 
perspective, the idea of limiting forum choice in patent cases is 
attractive to many stakeholders.  Indeed, numerous companies,129 
public interest organizations,130 academics,131 and even the former 
Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit132 filed amicus briefs in support of 
Heartland.133  Yet an examination of the relevant statutory language, 
as well as historical evidence about the purpose of the various 
statutory amendments and trends in venue law more generally, makes 
clear that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the patent venue 
statute is the correct one. 
C. The Federal Circuit Correctly Decided VE Holding 
Put most simply, VE Holding involved a routine application of a 
facially clear statute.  Specifically, the change in statutory language 
between Fourco and VE Holding justifies the court’s holding that 
                                                
 126. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 20, at i. 
 127. Id. at 9–15; cf. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 118, at 9 (“To be 
clear, the argument set forth here is that this Court’s holding in VE Holding no 
longer applies given the changed language in §§ 1391(a) and (c).  In the alternative, 
however, the validity of VE Holding should be re-examined by this Court en banc.”). 
 128. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 20, at 8 (citation omitted). 
 129. See Brief of Amici Curiae 32 Internet Companies, Retailers, and Associations, 
supra note 58, at 2–3; Brief of Dell Inc. and the Software & Information Industry 
Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, TC Heartland, No. 16-341, at 2 (U.S. 
Oct. 17, 2016). 
 130. See Brief of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge as Amici 
Curiae in Support of the Petition, TC Heartland, No. 16-341, at 2 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2016). 
 131. See Brief of Amici Curiae 56 Professors of Law and Economics, supra note 58. 
 132. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Paul R. Michel in Support of Petitioner, TC 
Heartland, No. 16-341, at 7 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2016). 
 133. For a collection of amicus briefs filed in support of Heartland, see TC 
Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/tc-heartland-llc-v-kraft-foods-group-brands-llc. 
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§ 1391(c)’s definition of residence applies to the patent venue 
statute.  At the time the Supreme Court decided Fourco, § 1391(c) 
provided that “[a] corporation may be sued in any judicial district in 
which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing 
business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence 
of such corporation for venue purposes.”134  But Congress changed 
§ 1391(c) in 1988 to read, “For purposes of venue under this chapter, 
a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any 
judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the 
time the action is commenced.”135 
The 1988 amendment to § 1391(c) is critical to the interpretation of 
the patent venue statute for at least two reasons.  First, Congress added 
the language “[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter,” which makes 
crystal clear that the definition of “resides” applies to all provisions of 
chapter 87 of the Judicial Code, including § 1400(b).136  Nothing in the 
statutory language provides any indication that the definition of 
“residence” in § 1391(c) should not apply to neighboring provisions 
such as § 1400(b).  Moreover, historical evidence suggests that the 
prefatory phrase was added to § 1391(c) for the precise purpose of 
making clear that § 1391(c) defined “residence” as the term is used in 
§ 1400(b).  For instance, the reporter for the Judicial Conference’s 
Subcommittee on Federal Jurisdiction, Professor Edward Cooper, 
stated in a memorandum that § 1391(c)’s revised definition of 
residence applies “to the venue provisions gathered in Chapter 87 of 
the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 through 1412,”137 which, 
obviously, includes § 1400(b).  In addition, the subcommittee’s initial 
proposal for § 1391(c) apparently began with the prefatory language, 
“[f]or the purposes of Subsections (A) and (B),” which would have 
limited the applicability of § 1391(c)’s definition of corporate residence 
to the general venue statute.138  But the subcommittee replaced that 
language with “[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter” before 
submitting the proposal to Congress, leading contemporaneous 
                                                
 134. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1946). 
 135. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988). 
 136. See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1578 
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The phrase ‘this chapter’ refers to chapter 87 of title 28, which 
encompasses §§ 1391–1412, and thus includes § 1400(b).  On its face, § 1391(c) 
clearly applies to § 1400(b), and thus redefines the meaning of the term ‘resides’ in 
that section.”). 
 137. Cooper, supra note 72, at 438. 
 138. Alan B. Rich et al., The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act:  New Patent 
Venue, Mandatory Arbitration and More, 5 HIGH TECH L.J. 311, 317–19 (1990). 
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commentators to conclude that “[t]his evolution is convincing evidence 
that the drafters intended the new definition to apply to all of chapter 
87, including [§] 1400(b).”139  This historical evidence, though perhaps 
not overwhelming, at least casts doubt on Heartland’s repeated claim 
that if Congress were relying on the prefatory phrase “[f]or purposes of 
venue under this chapter” to apply § 1391(c) to the patent venue statute, 
it would amount to hiding “a huge [statutory] elephant . . . in the 
smallest of mouseholes.”140 
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, there was a marked 
change in the structure of § 1391(c) between Fourco and VE Holding.  
The 1948 version of § 1391(c) not only defined where corporations 
“reside,” it also set forth substantive rules about where venue lies in 
cases filed against corporations.  Thus, at the time of Fourco, there 
were two relevant substantive provisions on venue:  (1) § 1391(c), 
which said that corporations could be sued in judicial districts where 
they were incorporated, licensed to do business, or doing business; 
and (2) § 1400(b), which said that defendants could be sued where 
they resided or where they committed acts of patent infringement 
and had a regular and established place of business.  On their face, 
these provisions were in tension with one another.  Venue based on 
merely “doing business” or being “licensed to do business,” as 
permitted under § 1391(c), was broader than venue based on 
“infringement” plus “a regular and established place of business” 
under § 1400(b).141  This tension makes it easy to understand why the 
Supreme Court in Fourco decided that § 1400(b), the narrower and 
                                                
 139. Id. at 319. 
 140. E.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 20, at 24. 
 141. See, e.g., Scaramucci v. FMC Corp., 258 F. Supp. 598, 601 (W.D. Okla. 1966) 
(holding that “being licensed to do business in Oklahoma” was not sufficient to 
satisfy the “regular and established place of business” requirement); Mastantuono v. 
Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 184 F. Supp. 178, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“Mere ‘doing business’ in 
a district is not of itself sufficient to confer venue in patent suits.  Something more is 
required.  It must appear that a defendant is regularly engaged in carrying on a 
substantial part of its ordinary business on a permanent basis in a physical location 
within the district over which it exercises some measure of control.”).  But cf. In re 
Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (denying a mandamus petition 
seeking dismissal for improper venue, noting that “the appropriate inquiry is 
whether the corporate defendant does its business in [the] district through a 
permanent and continuous presence there and not as [the defendant] argues, 
whether it has a fixed physical presence in the sense of a formal office or store”). 
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more specific statute, was “the sole and exclusive provision 
controlling venue in patent infringement actions.”142 
By the time the Federal Circuit decided VE Holding, however, 
Congress had removed the substantive provisions from § 1391(c) and 
made that subsection purely definitional.143  The updated version of 
§ 1391(c), unlike the version at issue in Fourco, said nothing about where 
venue lies in civil actions.  Instead, Congress moved the substantive 
provisions to a different part of § 1391.  This meant that § 1391(c) no 
longer conflicted with § 1400(b).  Rather, the amended version of 
§ 1391(c) could be read in perfect harmony with § 1400(b) by defining 
“resides”—a term used in but left undefined by § 1400(b).144 
D. VE Holding Remains Doctrinally Sound 
Assuming VE Holding was correct at the time, almost three decades 
have passed since the Federal Circuit issued its decision.  In the interim, 
Congress has amended the general venue statute, and the Supreme 
Court has taken a substantial interest in patent law.  Rather than calling 
                                                
 142. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1957) 
(“Specific terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute which 
otherwise might be controlling.” (quoting D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 
U.S. 204, 208 (1932))). 
 143. See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990) (“[Section] 1391(c) only operates to define a term in § 1400(b) . . . .”). 
 144. Interpreting corporate residence in § 1400(b) to be synonymous with 
personal jurisdiction also does not render superfluous the other venue option in 
§ 1400(b), which permits the plaintiff to file suit “where the defendant has 
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”  
For one, that option would still provide a basis for venue in suits against 
individuals because individuals reside in only one district—their district of 
domicile.  28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1) (2012).  For another, superfluity is not unusual 
in venue statutes.  For instance, § 1400(a), which governs venue in copyright 
infringement cases, provides two venue options, allowing suit to be filed “in the 
district in which the defendant or his agent [i] resides or [ii] may be found.”  Id. 
§ 1400(a).  “It is well settled that a corporation is ‘found’ [under § 1400(a)] in any 
district in which personal jurisdiction might be obtained over it,” Battle Creek Equip. 
Co. v. Roberts Mfg. Co., 460 F. Supp. 18, 21–22 (W.D. Mich. 1978), an interpretation 
that renders the “residency” option superfluous.  Taking a different approach, some 
courts, by looking to § 1391(c)’s definition of corporate residence in copyright cases, 
render the “may be found” provision superfluous.  E.g., Real Good Toys, Inc. v. XL 
Mach. Ltd., 163 F. Supp. 2d 421, 425 (D. Vt. 2001) (applying the copyright venue 
statute and noting that a corporation is “‘deemed to reside in any judicial district in 
which it is subject to personal jurisdiction’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)”).  Either way, 
the two independent venue options in § 1400(a) are interpreted to mean the exact 
same thing:  venue is proper in a suit against a corporation in any district in which 
that corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction. 
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VE Holding into question, however, these developments demonstrate 
that the Federal Circuit’s decision remains doctrinally sound. 
1. The 2011 amendments did not overrule VE Holding 
In 2011, Congress made several changes to the general venue 
statute,145 but those amendments do not undermine VE Holding.  If 
anything, they bolster the conclusion that § 1391(c)’s definition of 
residence applies to the patent venue statute. 
The very first subsection of the general venue statute, § 1391(a), is 
now titled “Applicability of Section” and includes the prefatory 
language, “Except as otherwise provided by law . . . .”146  But this 
language does not allow § 1391 to stand independently of § 1400(b).  
To begin with, this language in § 1391(a) is not new.  Before the 2011 
amendments, § 1391(a) and (b), which governed diversity and non-
diversity cases, respectively, both said that their general venue 
provisions applied “except as otherwise provided by law.”147  
Moreover, while there is a separate patent venue statute, § 1400(b), 
and that statute permits suit in the defendant’s district of residence, 
there is no definition of residence “otherwise provided by law.”  It 
therefore makes perfect sense for the definition set out in § 1391(c) 
to continue to apply to the venue option set forth in § 1400(b), just as 
many courts have done with other specialized venue statutes.148  
Finally, as if the text and structure of the statute were not clear 
enough, the House Report on the 2011 amendments indicated that 
the language “except as otherwise provided by law” in the newly 
enacted version of § 1391(a) referred to a list of specialized venue 
                                                
 145. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 
112-63, § 202, 125 Stat. 758. 
 146. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). 
 147. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (2006) (“A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded 
only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought 
only in . . . .”); id. § 1391(b) (2006) (“A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not 
founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be 
brought only in . . . .”). 
 148. See Aucoin v. Prudential Ins. Co., 959 F. Supp. 2d 185, 190 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(reading § 1391(c)’s definition of residence into 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2), a special 
venue statute for ERISA actions); Virts v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 2d 
101, 105 (D.D.C. 2013) (same); McHenry v. Astrue, No. 12-2512-SAC, 2012 WL 
6561540, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 14, 2012) (holding that because 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a 
special venue statute for social security actions, does not define “resides,” “the court 
will look to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which governs the venue of all civil actions brought in 
federal court”). 
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statutes compiled by the American Law Institute,149 which notably did 
not include § 1400(b).150 
A modification to § 1391(c) in 2011 further supports the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in VE Holding.  Whereas § 1391(c) previously 
defined residence “[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter,”151 it 
now defines residence “[f]or all venue purposes.”152  The statute is, 
again, clear on its face:  Section 1391(c) applies to all venue 
provisions, including § 1400(b).153  As if further evidence were 
necessary to confirm the statute’s unambiguous language, the House 
Report states explicitly that the definitions in § 1391(c) apply 
“universally,” meaning “to all venue statutes, including venue 
provisions that appear elsewhere in the United States Code.”154 
Notably, Heartland is not the first defendant in a patent suit to 
argue that the 2011 amendments overruled VE Holding.  There have 
been several district court decisions addressing this question, and 
they have all held—like the district court and Federal Circuit in TC 
Heartland—that the 2011 amendments did not affect VE Holding.155  
Perhaps even Heartland realized the weakness of this argument, 
                                                
 149. H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 18 n.8 (2011). 
 150. AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 253–90 (2004).  The 
American Law Institute, whose work on the Federal Judicial Code Revision Project 
was the basis for the 2011 amendments, also acknowledged that “all of the definitions 
set forth in new § 1391(c) apply globally to all venue statutes, whether of general or 
special applicability.”  Id. at 188–89. 
 151. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988). 
 152. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2012); see Script Sec. Sols. LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 170 F. 
Supp. 3d 928, 934 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (Bryson, J., sitting by designation) (“[T]he language 
of the 2011 amendment to [§] 1391(c) is even broader than the language it replaced.”). 
 153. Cf. Navajo Health Found.-Sage Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Burwell, 86 F. Supp. 3d 
1211, 1240 (D.N.M. 2015) (“Congress could have written 1391(c)(1) to say:  ‘For all 
venue purposes, except cases brought under § 1391(e)(1)(A), a natural person . . . shall be 
deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that person is domiciled.’  Congress 
did no[t].” (omission in original)). 
 154. H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 20 (2011). 
 155. See, e.g., Saint Lawrence Commc’ns LLC v. HTC Corp., No. 2:15-cv-919-JRG, 
2016 WL 1077950, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2016) (“The recent congressional 
changes to § 1391 do not disturb the Federal Circuit’s findings in VE Holding.”); Script 
Sec., 170 F. Supp. 3d at 934 (“[T]he analysis in VE Holding is just as applicable to the 
post-2011 version of the venue statute as it was to the pre-2011 version.”); Gro Master, 
Inc. v. Farmweld, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 974, 986 (N.D. Iowa 2013) (“If anything, the 
language of incorporation is even broader in the current version of § 1391(c) . . . .”); 
MLP Tech., Inc. v. LifeMed ID, Inc., No. 5:13-cv-00909, 2013 WL 6243943, at *2 n.1 
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2013) (“The 2011 amendment restructured section (c) but did 
not alter the substance of the statute and, therefore, the Court’s analysis [in VE 
Holding] does not change.”). 
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which would explain why it deemphasized its position about the 2011 
amendments at the Supreme Court.156 
2. No patent exceptionalism 
Though the Supreme Court has frequently reversed the Federal 
Circuit for adopting patent-specific rules, there is nothing 
exceptional about the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the patent 
venue statute.  The court’s holding that venue is proper in judicial 
districts where corporate defendants are subject to personal 
jurisdiction is completely in line with mainstream jurisprudence. 
Both the general venue statute and the patent venue statute 
provide that venue is proper where defendants reside.157  This parallel 
language is not a coincidence.  When Congress revised both 
provisions in 1948, it replaced the term “inhabitant” with “reside” to 
clarify where venue is proper when the defendant in a civil action is a 
corporation rather than a natural person.158  That Congress used the 
same term, at the same time, in both venue provisions strongly 
suggests that they should carry the same meaning.159 
Since 1988, § 1391(c) has provided that corporate defendants 
“reside” wherever they are subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction 
in the current action.  There is no doubt that this definition applies 
to the general venue statute.  Accordingly, in all civil cases governed 
by the general venue statute—that is, most cases in federal court—
corporate defendants can be sued in any judicial district where there 
is personal jurisdiction.160  By deciding that § 1391(c)’s residency 
                                                
 156. See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text. 
 157. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (“A civil action may be brought in a judicial district in 
which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the 
district is located.”); id. § 1400(b) (“Any civil action for patent infringement may be 
brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides . . . .”). 
 158. See supra Section I.D. 
 159. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (plurality opinion) 
(explaining the “premise that when Congress uses the same language in two statutes 
having similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after the other, it is 
appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning 
in both statutes”); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (applying the “normal 
rule of statutory construction,” which dictates that “identical words used in different 
parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning”). 
 160. See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non 
Conveniens:  Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1174 
(2006) (“The decision to equate venue and personal jurisdiction for corporate 
defendants is particularly interesting; Congress must not have seen national and 
multinational corporations as needing forum protection beyond that provided by 
personal jurisdiction.”); David H. Taylor, The Forum Selection Clause:  A Tale of Two 
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definition applied to the patent venue statute, the Federal Circuit in 
VE Holding was simply treating corporate defendants in patent cases 
like corporate defendants in other types of federal civil actions.161  If 
there is anything “exceptional” in the TC Heartland litigation, it is the 
position of those who have criticized the Federal Circuit’s venue 
doctrine and urged the Supreme Court to adopt an unusually 
restrictive venue rule for patent cases only. 
Yet there is no reason to believe that Congress intended to protect 
defendants in patent cases more than in other types of civil cases.  The 
opposite, in fact, is arguably true.  When Congress enacted § 1400(b)’s 
predecessor in 1897, the goal was to make venue less restrictive, not more 
restrictive, in patent cases as compared to other types of civil actions.162  
Congress could have simply decided that patent cases, like other federal 
question cases, would be governed by the Act of 1887, limiting venue to 
where the defendant was an inhabitant.  But instead, Congress drafted 
the patent venue statute to facilitate infringement actions by, as one 
district judge put it, “enlarging jurisdictional opportunities to bring 
infringers into a federal court.”163 
III. ALTERNATIVE PATHS TO REFORMING FORUM SELECTION IN PATENT 
CASES 
Although the doctrinal arguments against the Federal Circuit’s 
current approach to venue law are unpersuasive, the broad options 
available under that approach raise important policy questions that 
deserve serious consideration.  Critics claim that many of the 
problems plaguing the patent system are caused by the concentration 
of suits in East Texas.164  Even if that is an overstatement, the fact that 
roughly forty percent of all patent suits are filed in a single, mostly 
                                                
Concepts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 853 (1993) (“In light of both expansive present day 
notions of personal jurisdiction and the recent amendment to the general venue 
provision specifying that a corporation shall be deemed to reside for venue purposes 
in any district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction, corporations are subject 
to suit in a potential multitude of forums.” (footnote omitted)). 
 161. Cf. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 692 
n.126 (2013) (“Venue will typically not be an issue in mass-tort cases with corporate 
defendants.  For corporations, venue is proper where the defendant resides, which is 
where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction when the case commenced.”). 
 162. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 163. Indus. Research Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 29 F.2d 623, 626 (N.D. Ohio 1928). 
 164. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Michael Risch, A Patent Reform We Can All Agree 
on, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/ 
wp/2015/11/20/why-do-patent-lawyers-like-to-file-in-texas. 
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rural district in Texas should raise eyebrows.165  In this final Part, we 
suggest some ways in which the law of forum selection in patent cases 
could be revised besides the questionable interpretation of the venue 
statute urged by the petitioner in TC Heartland. 
A. Amendment of the Patent Venue Statute 
Perhaps the most obvious option is for Congress to amend the 
patent venue statute to restrict forum choice.  A bill to this effect, the 
Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination (VENUE) Act, was 
proposed in the Senate last year.166  The Act provides that, absent 
consent, patent suits may generally be filed only where a defendant (1) 
is incorporated, (2) has its principal place of business, or (3) has 
committed an act of infringement and has a “physical facility that gives 
rise to the act of infringement.”167  If the bill stopped there, forum 
choice under the VENUE Act would be roughly equivalent to what it 
would be if the petitioner in TC Heartland prevails.168  Yet, in an apparent 
attempt to expand forum choice for small inventors, universities, and 
operating companies, the Act goes on to provide that, in certain 
circumstances, venue is proper where research, development, and 
manufacturing related to the patent in suit took place.169 
                                                
 165. See Brian Howard, Q4 2016 Litigation Update:  Patent Litigation, District Court, 
LEX MACHINA (Jan. 12, 2017), https://lexmachina.com/q4-litigation-update 
(reporting that the Eastern District of Texas received 1647 patent cases comprising 
36.4% of all patent cases filed in 2016); Brian Howard, 2015 End-of-Year Trends:  
Patent Litigation, District Court, LEX MACHINA (Jan. 7, 2016), https://lexmachina.com/ 
lex-machina-2015-end-of-year-trends (reporting that the Eastern District of Texas 
received 2540 patent cases comprising 43.6% of all patent cases filed in 2015). 
 166. Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination (VENUE) Act of 2016, S. 
2733, 114th Cong. 
 167. VENUE Act § 2(b)(1)–(2). 
 168. This is because § 1400(b) authorizes venue in the districts (1) in which the 
defendant “resides,” which, according to the petitioner in TC Heartland, means the 
place of incorporation, and (2) “where the defendant has committed acts of 
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”  The VENUE Act 
adds the option of the defendant’s principal place of business, but that would often be 
encompassed by § 1400(b)’s option of suing where the defendant committed acts of 
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.  Unlike § 1400(b), 
the third option from the VENUE Act requires a nexus between the act of 
infringement and a physical facility operated by the defendant, which could narrow 
venue options slightly. 
 169. VENUE Act § 2(b)(4) (providing that venue is proper “where an inventor 
named on the patent in suit conducted research or development that led to the 
application for the patent in suit”); id. § 2(b)(5) (providing that venue is proper 
“where a party has a regular and established physical facility that such party controls 
and operates, not primarily for the purpose of creating venue, and has—(A) engaged 
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A detailed analysis of the VENUE Act is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but a few points are worth mentioning.  One concern is that 
the VENUE Act will not redistribute patent cases evenly throughout 
the country.170  Instead, critics claim, the Act will shift the 
concentration of patent cases from districts that are perceived to be 
friendly to plaintiffs, such as the Eastern District of Texas, to districts 
that are friendly to defendants, such as the Northern District of 
California.171  A recent study by Colleen Chien and Michael Risch 
attempts to test such theories and predict where patent cases would 
be filed if either the VENUE Act or the petitioner’s position in TC 
Heartland becomes law.172  Though both reforms would shift cases out 
of East Texas, Chien and Risch conclude that the VENUE Act would 
disperse cases more widely than TC Heartland.173 
This is not to suggest that Congress should pass the VENUE Act as 
currently drafted.  Any patent venue reform from Congress should 
come only after careful and thorough consideration.  What the 
VENUE Act teaches, however, is that legislative reform has important 
advantages to judicial reform, at least in this context.174  For one, 
Congress has the ability to draft more tailored venue rules that treat 
some groups of plaintiffs—small inventors, universities, and operating 
companies—differently than others, as appropriate.175  Also, unlike 
                                                
in management of significant research and development of an invention claimed in a 
patent in suit prior to the effective filing date of the patent; (B) manufactured a 
tangible product that is alleged to embody an invention claimed in a patent in suit; 
or (C) implemented a manufacturing process for a tangible good in which the 
process is alleged to embody an invention claimed in a patent in suit”). 
 170. Colleen V. Chien & Michael Risch, Recalibrating Patent Venue, 77 MD. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834130. 
 171. See Letter to Congress from 28 Law Professors & Economists Urging Caution 
on the VENUE Act 1 (Aug. 1, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816062 (“The 
reality is that the major proponents of changing the venue rules are primarily large 
high-tech companies and retailers with an online presence sued in the Eastern 
District of Texas that would rather litigate in a small number of more defendant-
friendly jurisdictions.”). 
 172. Chien & Risch, supra note 170, at 31. 
 173. Id. at 37, tbl. 7 (indicating that 62.9% of patent cases would be concentrated 
in the top five districts under TC Heartland, while that number decreases to 56.4% 
under the VENUE Act). 
 174. Cf. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform:  The Courts, Congress, and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 279, 282 (2015) (identifying several 
areas in which legislative reform of procedure in patent cases is not appropriate 
because of the clear risk of unintended consequences and because the courts are 
already making useful changes in those areas). 
 175. While courts may be better positioned to tailor substantive patent law 
doctrine, see, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
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judicial reform, a legislative fix could—and the VENUE Act would—
rectify the longstanding anomaly that patent infringement suits and 
patent declaratory judgment suits, which are the mirror image of one 
another, are governed by different venue provisions.176 
Finally, legislative reform could avoid unintended consequences 
that judicial reform cannot.  For example, a decision in TC Heartland 
that § 1391(c) does not apply to § 1400(b) could impact venue law 
outside the patent context.  Defendants in ERISA cases, for instance, 
might argue that courts should no longer import the definition of 
corporate residence from § 1391(c) into the specialized venue statute 
for ERISA.177  The same goes for many other specialized venue 
statutes that permit suit in the defendant’s district of residence.178  A 
victory for the petitioner in TC Heartland would also provide 
corporations with ammunition to argue that Congress should limit 
venue in civil cases across the board, just like in patent cases.  Simply 
put, although the VENUE Act may not be the perfect solution to 
forum shopping in patent cases, putting this problem in Congress’s 
hands makes more sense than resorting to a questionable 
interpretation of the venue statute that could have unintended 
consequences beyond patent litigation. 
                                                
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 5 (2009), Congress has long been responsible for crafting the 
venue laws. 
 176. See VENUE Act § 2(b).  Venue in patent declaratory judgment actions is 
currently governed by the general venue statute, § 1391, because § 1400(b) applies 
only to “civil action[s] for patent infringement.”  Notably, however, the VENUE Act 
would not alter personal jurisdiction requirements in declaratory judgment suits, 
which can be very difficult to satisfy.  See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal 
Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 43, 47 (2010) (discussing, 
among other decisions, Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355 
(Fed. Cir. 1998), in which the Federal Circuit ruled that sending cease-and-desist 
letters into a forum, on its own, is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction).  But 
cf. Xilinx, Inc. v. Papst Licensing GmbH & Co., 848 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(upholding personal jurisdiction—without distinguishing some of the court’s prior 
case law—in a declaratory judgment suit where the patentee’s primary contacts with 
the forum state were sending cease-and-desist letters into the state and engaging in 
unsuccessful licensing negotiations there).  Because of the high bar for establishing 
personal jurisdiction in declaratory judgment suits, the VENUE Act alone would not 
significantly expand forum choices for accused infringers seeking declaratory relief. 
 177. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 148. 
 178. See generally 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3803, at 48–49 (collecting 
statutes). 
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B. Uniform Procedural Rules for Patent Cases 
Another way to reduce forum shopping in patent cases would be to 
mandate greater uniformity of procedural rules among the district 
courts.  Many factors have incentivized patentees to file their cases in 
East Texas,179 including average time to trial,180 the court’s perceived 
expertise with patents,181 and the court’s reputation as being 
“patentee-friendly.”182  Procedural differences from court-to-court, 
and even judge-to-judge, also play a key role in forum selection in 
patent litigation.183  Approximately one-third of the district courts in 
the country have adopted local rules governing patent cases.184  Yet 
even among courts with local patent rules, there is a lack of 
uniformity in terms of how infringement and validity contentions are 
handled, how claim construction is conducted, and how discovery 
proceeds.185  What is more, in district courts with local patent rules, as 
well as those without, many individual judges have adopted standing 
orders (or “local-local rules”) dictating how patent litigation will 
proceed in their courtrooms.186  In the District of Delaware, for 
example, each of the four district judges has his or her own set of 
rules for patent cases.187 
Another procedural difference among district courts that has 
major implications for forum choice is the manner in which cases are 
assigned to judges within a particular district.188  Most districts 
randomize this process to prevent plaintiffs from “judge shopping.”189  
That is not the case in East Texas, however.  That district is divided 
                                                
 179. See generally Anderson, supra note 24, at 633–36; Fromer, supra note 20, at 
1464; Klerman & Reilly, supra note 24, at 250. 
 180. Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 403 (2010). 
 181. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases:  Does Geographic Choice 
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 899–900 (2001). 
 182. See Fromer, supra note 20, at 1445; Lemley, supra note 180, at 402. 
 183. See Anderson, supra note 24, at 670–74; La Belle, supra note 30, at 100–02; 
Moore, supra note 181, at 899–900. 
 184. See La Belle, supra note 30, at 96; Travis Jensen, Basics, LOC. PAT. RULES, 
http://www.localpatentrules.com/basics (last updated Oct. 22, 2016). 
 185. La Belle, supra note 30, at 96–97. 
 186. Id. at 88–92. 
 187. See id. at 89–90 (noting that each judge uses different patent-specific 
scheduling orders). 
 188. Anderson, supra note 24, at 670–74; Klerman & Reilly, supra note 24, at 254–57. 
 189. See United States v. Mavroules, 798 F. Supp. 61, 61 (D. Mass. 1992) 
(explaining that assigning cases randomly “prevents judge shopping by any party, 
thereby enhancing public confidence in the assignment process”); Anderson, supra 
note 24, at 670. 
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into six divisions (Beaumont, Marshall, Paris, Sherman, Texarkana, 
Tyler, and Lufkin), and plaintiffs are allowed to select the division in 
which their suit will proceed.190  This ability to choose the division 
effectively determines the judge because of the unusual way in which 
the chief judge assigns cases by general order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 137.191  The most recent order provides for the following case 
allocation:  100% of patent cases filed in the Beaumont Division are 
assigned to Chief Judge Ron Clark, 95% of all civil cases (including 
patent cases) filed in the Marshall Division are assigned to Judge 
Rodney Gilstrap, 100% of patent cases filed in the Sherman Division 
are assigned to Judge Amos Mazzant, and 70% of patent cases filed in 
the Tyler Division are assigned to Judge Trey Schroeder.192  This 
practice explains why Judge Gilstrap heard more than 3000 patent 
cases between 2014 and mid-2016, which is more than the total 
number of patent cases filed in California, Florida, and New York 
combined during the same time period.193 
In their recent article, Chien and Risch acknowledge that reducing 
this procedural differentiation among district courts would be an 
effective way to curtail some of the incentives that lead litigants to 
forum shop—and judges to “forum sell”—in patent litigation.194  But, 
they claim, venue reform may be a quicker solution “[b]ecause it is 
very difficult to mandate how judges run their courtrooms.”195  Yet 
district judges’ discretion regarding procedural matters is not 
                                                
 190. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, The Attorney’s “How to” 
Guide for Civil Case Opening, para. 4 (June 11, 2014), www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/view_document.cgi?document=2353; Klerman & Reilly, supra note 24, at 255 
(explaining that plaintiffs in East Texas “can choose to file in any division simply by 
selecting it from a drop-down menu in the electronic filing system”). 
 191. Section 137 provides in relevant part, 
The business of a court having more than one judge shall be divided among 
the judges as provided by the rules and orders of the court. 
The chief judge of the district court shall be responsible for the observance 
of such rules and orders, and shall divide the business and assign the cases so 
far as such rules and orders do not otherwise prescribe. 
28 U.S.C. § 137 (2012). 
 192. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, General Order No. 16-7 
(July 15, 2016), http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/goFiles/16-07.pdf. 
 193. Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive:  A Critical Look at Patent 
Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 n.21 (2017). 
 194. Chien & Risch, supra note 170, at 4 (“The easiest way to reduce forum 
shopping would be to unwind the conditions that enable it:  a multitude of potential 
forums from which litigants may choose and the ability of district courts to differentiate 
themselves from one another in terms of potential benefits they can offer.”). 
 195. Id. 
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unfettered.  Congress could, for example, mandate uniform 
procedural rules for all patent cases,196 just as it has done in 
bankruptcy cases.197  A more modest approach could focus only on 
the most questionable procedural practices by, for instance, 
mandating that case assignment procedures be uniform and random 
to make judge shopping more difficult.198 
C. Reform of Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine 
Changes to personal jurisdiction doctrine could also change forum 
selection options in patent cases.  Although the Federal Circuit has 
held that personal jurisdiction usually exists in any state in which an 
infringing product is sold,199 that rule could be impacted by a 
pending Supreme Court case that does not involve patents at all.  In 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, a products liability case, the 
Supreme Court will decide in what circumstances a legal claim “arises 
out of” or “relates to” a defendant’s contacts with the forum state200—
an essential element of personal jurisdiction under the “minimum 
contacts” framework.201  Under the Federal Circuit’s current 
interpretation of this so-called nexus requirement, even a very small 
number of sales in the forum state can support jurisdiction over 
infringement claims seeking damages for all sales nationwide.  In TC 
Heartland, for example, the Federal Circuit held that Delaware had 
personal jurisdiction over infringement claims based on sales 
nationwide, even though only two percent of the sales of the 
infringing product occurred in Delaware.202  If the Court in Bristol-
Myers strengthens the nexus requirement, that could limit forum 
options in patent cases. 
                                                
 196. See La Belle, supra note 30, at 118–23. 
 197. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2012).  Congress granted the Supreme Court rulemaking 
authority for bankruptcy cases in 1964 by amending the Rules Enabling Act to 
provide the Court with “the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, 
writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in cases under title 
11,” the Bankruptcy Code.  Id.; see Alan N. Resnick, The Bankruptcy Rulemaking Process, 
70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 245, 246 (1996).  Pursuant to that authority, the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure were first promulgated in 1973 and govern most procedural 
questions in bankruptcy cases.  Id.  at 245–46. 
 198. See Jonas Anderson, Judge Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas, 48 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 539, 557 (2016). 
 199. Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 200. See 377 P.3d 874, 878 (Cal. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 827 (2017). 
 201. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 
 202. In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted 
sub nom. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016). 
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CONCLUSION 
Venue provides a rare example of a controversial area of 
procedural law in which the Federal Circuit has not engaged in any 
sort of exceptionalism.  The court’s expansive interpretation of the 
venue statute, though perhaps not ideal as a matter of policy, is well-
grounded in doctrine and is consistent with a long trend of 
expanding venue options.  To overturn VE Holding would require an 
interpretation of the venue statute that is questionable at best.  
Consequently, it is better to reform the law of forum selection in 
patent cases through careful and considered legislative reform, either 
of the patent venue statute or of other aspects of patent procedure 
that district courts have used to forum sell.  Alternatively, impending 
changes to the law of personal jurisdiction could constrain plaintiffs’ 
forum choices in patent cases without any action from Congress. 
